

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 07283

USEEC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: FR. PARM NATO XA
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 1978: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY

REF: PARIS 1304

1. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE IS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO PREDICT
HOW A GOVERNMENT OF THE LEFT WOULD CONDUCT FRENCH
FOREIGN POLICY. NOR IS IT AN ATTEMPT TO PREDICT
THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DOMESTIC
POLICIES (E.G. ON TRADE OR ON FRENCH RELATIONS WITH
THE FRG). IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE THE SOCIALIST
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PARTY'S CURRENT ORIENTATION TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY
ISSUES OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE US AS A GUIDE TO
HOW THE PS WOULD HOPE TO ACT IN GOVERNMENT. CAVEATS
ARE OBVIOUS. THERE IS NO WAY TO KNOW - IN THE EVENT
OF A LEFT VICTORY IN MARCH - HOW FREE A HAND THE
SOCIALISTS WOULD HAVE IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN
POLICY. A MINORITY PS GOVERNMENT (WITHOUT COMMUNISTS)

WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO IMPLEMENT SOCIALIST POLICIES THAN A LEFT GOVERNMENT CONTAINING COMMUNISTS. IN ALL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS ENVISAGING A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT, THERE WOULD BE CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOCIALISTS - E.G., BECAUSE THEY MIGHT NEED PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FROM EITHER THE COMMUNISTS OR THE POLITICAL CENTER, BECAUSE GISCARD WOULD BE LIKELY TO DEFEND A STRONG PRESIDENTIAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY, OR BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO SOCIALIST POLICIES. MOREOVER, THE PS IS BESET BY FACTIONALISM ON FOREIGN POLICY, AS ON DOMESTIC ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, A DESCRIPTION OF WHERE THE PS CURRENTLY STANDS - BASED IN RECENT AUTHORITATIVE PARTY STATEMENTS - PROVIDE SOME CLUES AS TO HOW IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO ACT IF IT CAME INTO GOVERNMENT. OUR PRIMARY SOURCES ARE (1) A MITTERRAND INTERVIEW IN LE MONDE FEBRUARY 23, (2) A MITTERRAND PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE DIPLOMATIC PRESS ASSOCIATION FEBRUARY 22, AND (3) AN UPDATED SOCIALIST VERSION OF THE COMMON PROGRAM (SPELLING OUT SPECIFICALLY SOCIALIST POSITIONS) PUBLISHED IN JANUARY.

2. MITTERRAND AND HIS PARTY HAVE PUT A GREAT DEAL OF RECENT EMPHASIS ON ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY WITH THE FOREIGN POLICY PURSUED BY GISCARD. THE
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SOCIALISTS DO NOT ADVOCATE CHANGING THE MAIN LINES OF FRENCH POLICY - TOWARD DETENTE, TOWARD NATO, TOWARD THE EC, TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. THE DIFFERENCES ARE IN NUANCE (EXCEPT IN AFRICAN POLICY WHERE THEY ARE FUNDAMENTAL). THE PS IS SOMEWHAT LESS FRIENDLY TOWARD THE US AND SOMEWHAT LESS CRITICAL OF MOSCOW THAN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. ITS DEFENSE POLICY IS INCREASINGLY GAULLIST - AN ATTITUDE WHICH DISTINGUISHES IT TO SOME DEGREE BOTH FROM THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND FROM THE COMMUNISTS. UNLIKE THE FORMER IT WOULD REDUCE CURRENT FRENCH COOPERATION WITH NATO; UNLIKE THE LATTER IT WOULD MAINTAIN A FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT (AT LEAST PROVISIONALLY) WHICH IS NOT HEDGED BY ELEMENTS PARTIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION (E.G., NO-FIRST-USE, "ALL AZIMUTHS"). IN TWO AREAS PS INDEPENDENT POLICIES ARE MOST PRONOUNCED. THE FIRST IS DISARMAMENT, THOUGH THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED GOVERNMENT POLICY HAS NARROWED THE GAP CONSIDERABLY BETWEEN GISCARD AND THE PS. THE SOCIALISTS FAVOR ACTIVE DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES ON ALL FRONTS; UNFORTUNATELY THEIR PROPENSITY FOR THE GRANDIOSE (E.G. A EUROPE-WIDE CONFERENCE ON CON-

VENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR THEATER WEAPONS, A WORLD

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CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT) DETRACTS FROM
THE PRACTICALITY OF THEIR DISARMAMENT IDEAS. THE
SECOND AREA IS AFRICA, WHERE A SOCIALIST POLICY OF
REDUCED "INTERVENTIONISM" MARKS A SHARP DIFFERENCE
WITH GISCARD'S HIGHLY ACTIVIST EFFORTS. FINALLY,
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR TENSION BETWEEN
GISCARD AND MITTERRAND (IF HE BECOMES PRIME MINISTER)
OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE OF WHERE THE FOREIGN-
POLICY-MAKING POWER LIES. END SUMMARY

3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: WHO RUNS FOREIGN
POLICY? IN A POLITICAL SPEECH ON JANUARY 27,
GISCARD TOLD THE FRENCH VOTERS THAT, IF THEY VOTED
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THE LEFT INTO POWER, HE AS PRESIDENT COULD NOT PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEFT'S COMMON PROGRAM. ON FEBRUARY 9, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH JOURNALISTS, HE ADDRESSED THE SAME CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN POLICY SPECIFICALLY. BUT HE WAS MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS. HE SAID THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A LEFT VICTORY, THERE WOULD BE "CONSEQUENCES" FOR FOREIGN POLICY. BUT HE DID NOT SAY THAT HE COULD NOT PREVENT THE COMMON PROGRAM AS IT CONCERNED FOREIGN POLICY. THE DIFFERENCE IS IMPORTANT. GISCARD IS CLEARLY DETERMINED TO CLING TO THE FOREIGN POLICY POWERS WHICH THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY HAS ACCUMULATED DURING THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. TODAY IT IS GISCARD, NOT THE PRIME MINISTER OR FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO CONTROLS FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY, ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION IS EXTREMELY IMPRECISE ON WHERE FOREIGN POLICY POWERS RESIDE.

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRIME MINISTER (MITTERRAND) OF A DIFFERENT POLITICAL ORIENTATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, A SITUATION UNPRECEDENTED IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC, UNDERLINES THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN MITTERRAND AND GISCARD ON CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY. LAST WEEK MITTERRAND WAFFLED ON THIS CRITICAL POINT. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONTINUE TO REPRESENT FRANCE AT SUMMITS, ACCOMPANIED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ALSO SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO DEPRIVE THE PRESIDENT OF THE AUTHORITY CONFERRED ON HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION. NEVERTHELESS, MITTERRAND REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THERE IS A FOREIGN POLICY DOMAIN RESERVED TO THE PRESIDENT, AND HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PLAY THEIR FULL ROLE IN

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THE DETERMINATION AND CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. MITTERRAND ARGUED FOR COMPROMISE; THE WISDOM OF MEN, HE SAID, SHOULD MAKE UP FOR THE SILENCE OF INSTITUTIONS. MITTERRAND'S PROBLEM, IN SHORT, IS TO STAKE OUT A FOREIGN POLICY TURF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, WITHOUT SEVERELY UNDERCUTTING THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, TO WHICH THE SOCIALIST LEADER PROBABLY ALSO ASPIRES. THE PROSPECT, IN THE EVENT OF A LEFT VICTORY, IS FOR MAJOR SKIRMISHING BETWEEN GISCARD AND MITTERRAND ON THIS IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.

5. THE US. AS JEAN-FRANCOIS REVEL, THE ANTI-COMMUNIST COLUMNIST OF L'EXPRESS, NOTED TO US LAST WEEK, THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS SPEAK TWO LANGUAGES. NOWHERE IS THIS MORE TRUE THAN IN THEIR INFREQUENT REFERENCES TO THE US. MITTERRAND HAS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE IS NO MILITARY THREAT FROM THE US, HAS REJECTED AN "ALL AZIMUTHS" NUCLEAR POLICY BECAUSE FRANCE SHOULD NOT TARGET ITS ALLIES, AND HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR CLOSE TIES WITH THE US. AT THE SAME TIME HE HAS CONTENDED THAT THE US POSES A REAL ECONOMIC THREAT, HAS BLAMED US FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AND HAS USED THE US AS A SHORTHAND OBJECT OF HIS ATTACKS ON CAPITALISM AND MULTINATIONALS. WHILE, AS PRIME MINISTER, HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SEEK A DIALOGUE WITH THE US, HIS POLITICAL ORIENTATION INDICATES THAT IT WOULD BEGIN FROM THE BASE OF A STRONG, ALMOST GAULLIST, SENSE OF INDEPENDENCE, WITH A NEO-MARXIST OVERLAY.

6. THE USSR. NEITHER MITTERRAND NOR HIS PARTY HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET UNION BY NAME. THEY HAVE TENDED TO TREAT THE SOVIETS AS BEING BASICALLY DEFENSE-MINDED IN EUROPE AND NOT CONFIDENTIAL

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PARTICULARLY EXPANSIONIST OUTSIDE EUROPE. WHILE ADHERING TO FRANCE'S ALLIANCES, THEY HAVE SAID LITTLE TO INDICATE WHY THEY FEEL FRANCE NEEDS TO PROTECT ITSELF FROM THE EAST. LAST WEEK MITTERRAND WAS CHARACTERISTICALLY VAGUE ABOUT MOSCOW. HE SPOKE OF THE NEED TO BUILD CONDITIONS FOR A GOOD UNDERSTANDING AND TO GIVE THE EXISTING TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP (SIC) A REAL CONTENT, NOTING SPECIFICALLY COLLECTIVE SECURITY, DISARMAMENT, HELSINKI/ BELGRADE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. INCIDENTALLY, THE SOCIALISTS HAVE ADDED A HUMAN RIGHTS PLANK TO THEIR RECENTLY UPDATED VERSION OF THE COMMON PROGRAM, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY AGGRESSIVE IN APPLYING
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HUMAN RIGHTS CRITERIA TO THE SOVIET UNION.

7. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. MITTERRAND'S ALLIANCE CREDENTIALS ARE OF LONG-STANDING. THE COMMON PROGRAM ADVOCATES MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING ALLIANCES, INCLUDING THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. BUT IT REJECTS ANY FORM OF REINTEGRATION INTO THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE. IN ITS UPDATE OF THE COMMON PROGRAM EARLY THIS YEAR, THE SOCIALIST PARTY SAID IT WOULD PUT AN END TO THE "MEASURES OF REINSERTION" TAKEN BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. LAST WEEK MITTERRAND REVEALED ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN THINKING. HE SAID A LEFT GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT SEEK A REVISION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, BUT HE FAVORED A BROAD DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW TO UPDATING IT. HE ALSO REPEATED CRITICISM OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE "SLOW SLIDE TOWARD ATLANTIC INTEGRATION" OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. IN SUM, MITTERRAND'S ATTITUDE CONTINUES TO REFLECT A NEO-GAULLIST LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR NATO.

8. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC). MITTERRAND SAID LAST WEEK THAT THE LEFT IS NOT INTERESTED IN ABSTRACT IDEAS SUCH AS SUPRA-NATIONALITY, BUT IN QUESTIONS OF REAL IMPORTANCE SUCH AS MONETARY POLICY. HE DESCRIBED THE SOCIALISTS' HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PURSUE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EC WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TRANSFORMING IT FROM INSIDE, SO AS TO GIVE IT "A DIFFERENT SOCIAL CONTENT AND USING ALL THE WEIGHT OF OUR COUNTRY ON ITS ECONOMIC CONTENT." SINCE ALL THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE TREATY OF ROME HAVE NOT BEEN USED, SAID MITTERRAND, IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO EXTEND THE CONFIDENTIAL

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POWERS OF THE EC. THE SOCIALISTS ENVISAGE THE TEMPORARY USE OF THE SAFEGUARD CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF ROME TO DEAL WITH THE TRADE BALANCE PROBLEMS THEY EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER DURING THEIR FIRST 12 TO 18 MONTHS IN POWER. THE UPDATED SOCIALIST VERSION OF THE COMMON PROGRAM ALSO CONTEMPLATES REGULATION OF MULTINATIONALS IN EC MEMBERS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE MOVEMENT OF THEIR CAPITAL). CLEARLY, THE SOCIALISTS ARE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE ELEMENTS OF THE EC'S OPEN FRONTIERS POLICY, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, FOR THE SAKE OF THE ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING OF FRANCE.

9. DEFENSE. IT IS ON DEFENSE ISSUES THAT MITTERRAND DIVERGES MOST EXPLICITLY FROM THE COMMUNISTS. (SEE PARIS 1304). LAST WEEK HE REITERATED HIS DIFFERENCES. AS NOTED ABOVE, HE REJECTS THE PCF'S "ALL AZIMUTHS" NUCLEAR TARGETTING POLICY. HE SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SINCE FRANCE'S LIMITED STRIKE CAPABILITY DOES NOT PERMIT IT TO AWAIT A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST IT. MITTERRAND ALSO OBJECTED TO THE PCF'S PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING ON USE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE TOO UNWIELDY. THE SOCIALISTS FAVOR REQUIRING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF BE "ASSOCIATED" WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE. MITTERRAND ALSO REJECTED THE PCF POSITION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE TARGETTED ON CITIES, SINCE THIS WAS A KEY ASPECT OF THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THE FORCE DE FRAPPE.

10. THE SOCIALIST UPDATING OF THE COMMON PROGRAM SAYS THAT THE FORCE DE FRAPPE WOULD BE KEPT "IN

BEING" (EN ETAT), BUT THAT THE PS WOULD LEAVE THE
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FINAL DECISION ON IT TO THE "FRENCH PEOPLE"
(PRESUMABLY THROUGH REFERENDUM AT SOME POINT).

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IN SUM, SOCIALIST DEFENSE POLICY CONTINUES TO EVOLVE
FROM THE MIDDLE SIXTIES, WHEN MITTERRAND WAS STILL
TALKING ABOUT DISMANTLING FRANCE'S INDEPENDENT
NUCLEAR FORCE AND DESCRIBING ITS ADHERENCE TO NATO
AS TEMPORARY. THE EVOLUTION IS IN A GAULLIST
DIRECTION (FOR EXAMPLE, MITTERRAND SAID LAST WEEK
THAT FRANCE SHOULD HAVE ITS OWN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

AND NOT DEPEND ON THE US-BUILT AWAC'S SYSTEM). BUT STRONG DISARMAMENT SENTIMENT, TRADITIONAL IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY, PUTS RESTRAINTS ON HOW FAR THE PS WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO.

11. DISARMAMENT. ON THIS ISSUE PARTICULARLY, THE
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PS HAS SOUGHT TO CARVE OUT AN INDIVIDUAL POSITION, IN EFFECT PROMISING TO PUT FRANCE IN THE FOREFRONT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS. IN FACT, THE RECENTLY UNVEILED FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE WAS PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO BLUNT THE EFFECT OF SOCIALIST ACTIVITY IN THIS FIELD. LAST WEEK MITTERRAND ADDED OR REITERATED SEVERAL ELEMENTS OF THE EXISTING STRONG SOCIALIST POSITION IN FAVOR OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. ON ARMS SALES HE STATED THAT "THE POLICY OF ARMS SALES WILL BE PROGRESSIVELY REVERSED. OUR GENERAL IDEA IS TO LIMIT ARMS SALES AND TO CEASE BALANCING OUR EXTERNAL TRADE ON THIS BASIS...WE WILL REDUCE THE VOLUME OF (FRENCH) SALES AND WE WILL END IMMEDIATELY ALL SALES OF ARMS OR REPLACEMENT PARTS TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA." REDUCTIONS WOULD BE GRADUATED, SO AS TO AVOID A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT. MITTERRAND RE-ITERATED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY WHERE NOT ONLY CONVENTIONAL BUT ALSO NUCLEAR ARMS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. (THIS PROPOSAL IS SIMILAR TO GISCARD'S PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, EXCEPT THAT IT INCLUDES NUCLEAR WEAPONS.) HE ALSO REPEATED THE SOCIALIST POSITION THAT FRANCE SHOULD JOIN THE CCD IN GENEVA AND THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. THE NEW SOCIALIST UPDATE OF THE COMMON PROGRAM ALSO ADDS SOME NEW ELEMENTS. A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK TO BRING FRANCE AND THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS INTO SALT "AT A TIME CALLED FOR BY THE STATE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS." IT WOULD ALSO WORK FOR A WORLD CONFERENCE LOOKING TOWARD GENERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, OR, FAILING THAT, A CONFERENCE OF
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NUCLEAR POWERS.

12. MIDDLE EAST. DESPITE LONG-STANDING PS TIES

WITH ISRAEL, MITTERRAND WAS CRITICAL LAST WEEK OF
BEGIN'S SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE SINAI. HE ALSO
APPROVED SADAT'S INITIATIVE TO GO TO JERUSALEM,
ADDING THAT HE PREFERRED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
THE PARTIES TO LARGE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, AT
LEAST IN THE FIRST STAGE. WHILE A PS-DOMINATED
GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO IMPROVE FRANCE'S
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THE UPDATED SOCIALIST
COMMON PROGRAM RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE TO A HOMELAND OF THEIR OWN (THE EGYPTIAN
AMBASSADOR HAS REMARKED TO US ACIDLY THAT THE PS
HAS NEVER ACTUALLY DEFINED WHERE THAT HOMELAND
SHOULD BE).

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13. AFRICA. AT A DIPLOMATIC CORPS LUNCH LAST WEEK,
JEAN FRANCOIS-PONCET, SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE

PRESIDENCY, WAS ASKED TO DESCRIBE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PS FOREIGN POLICY AND GISCARD'S. HIS ANSWER WAS THAT THERE WERE NOT MANY DIFFERENCES - "EXCEPT IN AFRICA." WHILE FRANCOIS-PONCET DID NOT ELABORATE, THE DIFFERENCES ARE SIGNIFICANT. MITTERRAND SAID LAST WEEK THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA OR AID TO "BLOODY, RACIST, OR FASCIST" REGIMES. THE SOCIALIST PARTY'S LEADING EXPERT IN THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS HAS TOLD US THAT THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN

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A SHABA INTERVENTION UNDER THE SOCIALISTS. THE PS HAS BEEN SIMILARLY CRITICAL OF FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT OF MAURITANIA AND MOROCCO IN THE DISPUTE OVER THE EX-SPANISH SAHARA. OTHER AREAS WHERE A RETREAT FROM ACTIVISM WOULD BE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT ARE CHAD (WHERE THE FRENCH HAVE RECENTLY BEEFED UP THEIR FORCES TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST REBEL ACTIVITY) AND DJIBOUTI WHERE A 4,000 MAN PLUS DETACHMENT IS STATIONED AT THE REQUEST OF THE DJIBOUTI GOVERNMENT. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD REVIEW MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. THE SOCIALIST POLICY OF REDUCED ACTIVISM IN AFRICA IMPLIES A BELIEF, CONTRARY TO GISCARD'S, THAT AFRICA IS NEITHER AN IMPORTANT LOCUS OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION NOR WORTH MAJOR EFFORTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL FRENCH INTERESTS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEE, OF COURSE, WHETHER THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF GOVERNING - GIVEN FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL INTERESTS IN AFRICA - WOULD CHANGE THIS SOCIALIST PERCEPTION.

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